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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TOMMY GLEN CARTER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 970038-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for theft from a person, 
a second degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction over the 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. In moving for a continuance, did defendant demonstrate 
that the testimony of the absent witness was both material and 
admissible and that he had exercised due diligence in preparing 
for the case prior to requesting the continuance? 
Whether a continuance should be granted or denied is within 
I 
the sound discretion of the trial court. On appeal, such a 
decision will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that 
discretion. State v. Creviston. 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982); 
State v. Horton. 848 P.2d 708, 714 (Utah App. 1993). 
1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
References to constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules 
are unnecessary to the disposition of this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of theft from a person, 
a second degree felony, for taking money from the person of 
Joshua Irvin on a downtown Salt Lake City street on June 27, 1996 
(R. 3-4). He was tried before a jury, convicted as charged, and 
sentenced to 1-15 years in the Utah State Prison, with credit for 
time served. He was also ordered to pay a $500 recoupment fee to 
the Legal Defender Association and restitution of $13 to the 
victim, jointly and severally with his co-defendant (R. 109-10). 
Defendant subsequently filed this timely appeal (R. Ill, 113). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 233-34 (Utah 
1992). Joshua Irvin, the victim in this case, alighted from a 
bus in downtown Salt Lake, intending to buy a soda before 
transferring to another bus that would take him home (R. 121, p. 
3-4).l To that end, he separated the money in his pocket, 
putting a ten dollar bill and a few one dollar bills in his left 
1
 The trial transcript as it appears in the record on 
appeal compresses six pages of trial transcript into one page of 
appellate record. To enhance the precision of its citations, the 
State uses "R" to denote the appellate record citation and "p" to 
refer to the transcript page within the record citation. 
2 
front pocket and the loose change in his right front pocket (Id, 
at p. 5). As he was walking towards a nearby Circle K store, he 
felt a bump "on the right side from behind by someone" (Id. at 
p.6). The bump, which was hard enough to stop him, prompted him 
to turn towards the individual, either to apologize or to get out 
of the way (Id.). At that juncture, he stated, "I felt a tug on 
my pants, turned around and saw that my [left] pocket was being 
got into" by a second individual (R. 122 at p. 7). 
Irvin, both surprised and frightened by these events, yelled 
something at the two intruders, who trotted away, smiling, in no 
apparent rush (Id. at pp. 9-10). Defendant shouted back at Irvin 
something like, "If I had a violin, I'd play it for you right 
now" (Id. at p. 10). Reluctant to go after the two by himself, 
Irvin at first decided just to forget the whole incident. On 
further reflection, however, he realized that he had been 
victimized and didn't want "to just lay down and let it happen" 
(Id. at p. 11). 
Irvin went to a nearby Travelodge and called 911, describing 
to the police what the two individuals were wearing (Id. at p. 
11-12). While waiting for the police, Irvin felt "antsy," 
wondering where the two had gone. He went outside the Travelodge 
and spotted them sitting at the bus station on the grass. 
Shortly thereafter, two officers on bicycles arrived at the 
Travelodge (R. 123, p. 14). Irvin described the two men and 
3 
pointed them out to the officers, who rode their bikes over to 
the bus station, where defendant and his companion, Kenneth 
Ellis, were arrested (R. 130, p. 156; R. 133, p. 73). The 
arresting officer searched defendant and found a ten dollar bill 
in his pocket (R. 133, p. 73).2 
At trial, the jury heard testimony from Joshua Irvin, both 
officers who responded to Irvin's 911 call, a robbery detective, 
defendant, Kenneth Ellis, and the Circle K clerk who was on duty 
that afternoon. 
The morning after both sides rested, counsel for Kenneth 
Ellis moved for a continuance. Ellis's counsel stated that Brian 
Meek, a jail inmate, had told Ellis that he knew someone named 
Joshua Irvin who used crystal methamphetamine (R. 165, p. 2 or 
addendum A). Acting on instructions from the court, Ellis's 
counsel spoke with Meek and then reported the following 
information back to the court: 
[Brian Meek] indicated to me that he went to 
a school [sic] with someone by the name of 
Joshua Irvin at Cyprus High School. He 
described the person as being tall. . . . He 
said that person was between five foot, nine 
and five foot, ten with long blonde hair. 
He said he lived in the Magna or West Valley 
Area. He indicated that he - the person does 
crystal methamphetamine. . . . He said that 
Defendant, Kenneth Ellis, and a store clerk all testified 
that defendant and Ellis bought two quarts of beer at the Circle 
K, which would account for the lack of one dollar bills found on 
defendant after the search (R. 140, p. 114; R. 145, p. 146; R. 
157, p. 215). 
4 
he had actually seen him around it, saw him 
do it but it has been within the last two 
years. He hasn't seen him recently. But he 
knows friends of his who knows [sic] Mr. 
Irvin much better than Mr. Meek knows him. 
Additionally, he indicates that one of his 
friends is owed money for Mr. Irvin for 
drugs. 
(R. 165, p. 2-3). On the basis of this information, Ellis's 
counsel requested a continuance. The court denied the motion (R. 
165, p. 4). Subsequently, the jury convicted defendant as 
charged (R. 109-10). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
defendant's motion for a continuance because defendant did not 
demonstrate that he met the standard required for the grant of 
such a motion. First, he failed to carry his burden of showing 
that the testimony of the absent witness was material because he 
did not even establish that the victim was, in fact, the person 
whom the absent witness claimed to know. Second, he failed to 
establish that the testimony would have been admissible pursuant 
to rule 608(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. And third, the 
record does not reveal any indication that defendant used due 
diligence to seek out any other witnesses who could have 
corroborated defendant's version of the relevant events. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE BECAUSE 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO CARRY HIS 
BURDEN OF DEMONSTRATING THAT THE 
TESTIMONY OF THE ABSENT WITNESS WAS 
BOTH MATERIAL AND ADMISSIBLE AND 
THAT COUNSEL HAD EXERCISED DUE 
DILIGENCE IN PREPARING THE CASE 
BEFORE REQUESTING THE CONTINUANCE 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion 
by denying his motion for a continuance of his trial (Br. of App. 
at 10). He argues that he met the three-prong test for a 
continuance and that the trial court's refusal to grant his 
motion prejudiced him by preventing him from eliciting testimony 
that "may have led to impeachment of Irvin's accusations that the 
defendant took the money from Irvin's pocket and [Irvin's] claim, 
that he did not use marijuana'' (Br. of App. at 6) . 
A. Waiver 
At the outset, one fact requires clarification. Counsel for 
defendant did not move for a continuance at trial. Only his co-
defendant, Ellis, did so (R. 165, p.2 or addendum A). Under 
these circumstances, it is questionable whether defendant ever 
preserved this issue for appellate review. Cf. Lonao v. State, 
580 So.2d 212, 215 (Fla. App. 1991) (failure of defendant to 
either object himself or join in codefendant's objection waives 
review of issue on appeal); Brown v. Commonwealth, 780 S.W.2d 
627, 629 (Ky. 1989) (where objecting attorney did not make clear 
6 
that objection was made on behalf of both codefendants and where 
other attorney did not join in the objection, the issue is not 
preserved with respect to the non-objecting defendant); People v. 
Brown, 110 Cal.App.3d 24, 35 (Cal.Ct.App. 1980) (on appeal, 
defendant cannot take advantage of objections made by codefendant 
in absence of stipulation or understanding to that effect). 
Here, defendant did not join in Ellis's motion. The only 
indication that defendant intended to do so was his ambiguous 
statement, following Ellis's counsel's explanation of what she 
had learned from Meek, that "I don't have anything to add, your 
honor" (R. 165, p. 4) . This statement could reasonably be 
interpreted to mean either that defendant intended to join in the 
motion or that he had no articulable interest in it at all. Cf. 
State v. Dahlaren. 512 A.2d 906, 913 n.9 (Conn. 1986)(where 
codefendant alerted trial court in a timely fashion to 
possibility of error, failure of defendant to fully challenge 
ruling will not be dispositive). 
Furthermore, defendant and Ellis appeared to have 
incompatible interests. While Ellis was represented by a court-
appointed attorney from the Legal Defender Association, 
defendant's court-appointed LDA attorney had withdrawn because of 
an unspecified conflict of interest, leaving defendant 
represented by conflict counsel (R. 34-35). Where interests of 
co-defendants vary, it is neither logical nor ethically proper 
7 
for defendant to rely on a codefendant's pretrial motions. State 
v, Marahrens. 560 P.2d 1211, 1213 (Ariz. 1977). 
B. On the Merits 
In any event, the law is well-settled that a decision to 
grant or deny a continuance lies within the sound discretion of 
the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a 
clear abuse of that discretion. State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 
750, 752 (Utah 1982). It is equally well-settled that the burden 
is on the moving party to demonstrate that the requirements for 
granting a continuance have been met. State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 
708, 714 (Utah App. 1993). Thus, when a defendant moves for a 
continuance to procure the testimony of an absent witness, 
defendant assumes the burden of demonstrating three requirements: 
"that the testimony is material and admissible, that the witness 
could actually be procured within a reasonable time, and that due 
diligence had been exercised before making the request." State 
v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985) (citing State v. 
Creviston, 646 P.2d at 752); accord State v. Horton, 848 P.2d at 
714. 
In this case, even assuming arguendo that the objection of 
Ellis's counsel preserved the issue as to defendant, defendant 
has failed to demonstrate that the absent witness's testimony was 
either material to the issue of guilt or admissible under rule 
608(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. He has further failed to 
8 
establish that his counsel used due diligence in attempting to 
locate other witnesses to corroborate his account. 
1. Defendant failed to carry his burden of demonstrating 
that the absent witness's testimony was both admissible and 
material. 
Defendant argues that the testimony of the absent witness, 
Brian Meek, was material because it could impeach Joshua Irvin's 
testimony that he was not a drug user and that he did not 
approach defendant for the purpose of buying drugs (Br. of App. 
at 8, 9). In addition, defendant asserts, the testimony could 
have corroborated defendant's testimony that Irvin approached him 
to buy drugs (Br. of App. at 8).3 
Defendant's claim of materiality fails at the outset because 
of its speculative nature. Indeed, defendant has not even 
established that the victim in this case was, in fact, the same 
individual whom Brian Meek claimed to know. Establishing 
materiality through a positive identification would have been a 
simple matter. At the very least, counsel could have requested 
permission to reopen the defense case and could have recalled 
Joshua Irvin to the stand to ask him whether he attended Cyprus 
In his testimony, defendant had asserted that Joshua 
Irvin approached him near Crossroads Mall for the purpose of 
purchasing drugs. To that end, according to defendant, Irvin 
gave him ten dollars. With Irvin trailing behind, the pair then 
walked north for several blocks. Along the way, Irvin became 
angry and afraid that defendant intended to "rip him off." Irvin 
finally ran off, saying, "I'm going to get you niggers" (R. 145, 
p. 142-46). 
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High School, as Brian Meek contended. The answer to that 
question alone would have helped determine whether there was a 
true factual nexus between Meek and Irvin. Alternatively, since 
Brian Meek was housed at the county jail, defense counsel could 
have requested a short recess so that Meek could be called to the 
stand to identify Joshua Irvin.4 In either event, the trial 
court would have been afforded the opportunity to determine the 
fundamental materiality of Meek's testimony.5 
Not only has defendant failed to carry his burden of 
demonstrating the materiality of Brian Meek's testimony, but he 
has also failed to demonstrate why such testimony would be 
admissible. Of relevance to this case, rule 608(b), Utah Rules 
of Evidence, provides: 
Specific instances of the conduct of a 
witness, for the purpose of attacking . . . 
the witness' credibility,. . . may not be 
proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, 
however, in the discretion of the court, if 
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, 
be inquired into on cross-examination of the 
witness (1) concerning the witness' character 
4
 The State agrees with defendant that the second prong of 
the continuance standard has been met. That is, the absent 
witness could plainly be produced within a reasonable amount of 
time. See, e.g., State v. Horton, 848 P.2d at 714. 
5
 For the same reason, any claim of prejudicial error must 
fail. Absent a demonstrated factual nexus between Meek and 
Irvin, defendant has failed to carry his burden of showing that 
he "was materially prejudiced by the court's denial of the 
continuance or that the-trial result would have been different 
had the continuance been granted." State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 
474, 476 (Utah App. 1991). 
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for truthfulness or untruthfulness. . . . 
According to defense counsel's proffer, Meek was going to 
testify about specific instances during which he had seen Joshua 
Irvin use crystal methamphetamine (R. 165).6 However, rule 
608(b) makes clear that this testimony would not have been 
admissible to impeach Irvin's statements that he did not use 
illicit drugs and to otherwise attack Irvin's credibility.7 
State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702 (Utah App. 1993), plainly 
supports this interpretation of the law as applied to these 
facts. The defendant in Martinez, after engaging in several drug 
transactions with undercover agents, was charged with 
distribution of a controlled substance. At trial, undercover 
agent Anne Burchett testified that she misled defendant into 
believing that she was a drug user while, in fact, she was not. 
6
 In addition, Meeks was going to testify that Irvin owed 
one of his friends money for drugs (R. 165). This testimony 
would be inadmissible hearsay under rules 801(c) and 802, Utah 
Rules of Evidence. Defendant's suggestion that these statements 
"would not be excluded under the hearsay rule because both Irvin 
and the witness [Meeks] can be cross-examined on the testimony" 
is erroneous. See Appellant's Br. at 8-9. Defendant has ignored 
the fact that the declarant - the unnamed friend to whom Irvin 
allegedly owed money - did not testify. Hearsay evidence is 
inadmissible unless it falls under one of the enumerated 
exceptions listed in rule 803, none of which apply here. 
7
 According to the rule, the proper way for defendant to 
have impeached Irvin's credibility would have been to question 
him on cross-examination about the specific instances recounted 
by Meek during which Irvin allegedly used crystal 
methamphetamine. 
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Id. at 704. Defense counsel then proffered that his witness, 
Steve Farr, would testify that "he knew Burchett during the time 
she was working the Martinez case, that the two of them used 
cocaine and marijuana together, and that he observed Burchett *to 
be under the influence of drugs in a manner that was impossible 
and inconsistent with her having only simulated the use of 
drugs.'" Id. The trial court excluded this testimony under rule 
608(b). Id. This Court affirmed, stating that "Farr's testimony 
would have been extrinsic evidence of specific instances of 
Burchett's conduct for the purpose of attacking her credibility, 
which is exactly what Rule 608(b) was designed to exclude." Id. 
Just as in Martinez, Brian Meek's testimony in this case 
would have been inadmissible extrinsic evidence of specific 
instances of Irvin's conduct, offered for the explicit purpose of 
attacking Irvin's credibility.8 "Where the content of the 
prospective witness' testimony is . . . likely to be 
inadmissible, it is not an abuse of discretion to deny a 
continuance." Creviston, 646 P.2d at 752 (citation omitted). 
Here, where the testimony of Brian Meeks was likely to be 
inadmissible under rule 608(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence and 
8
 Furthermore, the testimony had no purpose other than 
impeachment. Establishing that Irvin was a drug user Would not 
demonstrate that defendant did not commit the crime. "It is not 
an abuse of discretion to deny a motion for continuance when the 
testimony sought is only for impeachment purposes" and does not 
serve to exonerate the defendant. Creviston, 64 6 P.2d at 753 
(citations omitted). 
12 
was immaterial as well, the trial court acted within its 
discretion in denying defendant's motion for a continuance, 
2. Defendant has made no showing that he used due diligence 
in investigating defendant's account of the events. 
Defendant has also failed to carry his burden of 
demonstrating that he exercised due diligence before requesting a 
continuance. He argues "it was unlikely that this witness would 
have been discovered prior to trial no matter how much due 
diligence the parties' [sic] exercised" (Br. of App. at 
9)(emphasis added). While defense counsel may have been unable 
to uncover this particular witness prior to trial even if due 
diligence was used, it is unclear whether defense counsel 
exercised due diligence to investigate any potential witnesses 
who might have corroborated defendant's story that Joshua Irvin 
was a drug user. 
Because defendant has failed to provide this Court with an 
adequate record from which to determine that his counsel 
exercised due diligence, this Court should presume the regularity 
of the proceedings below, affirming the trial court's denial of 
defendant's motion for a continuance. See State v. Blubaugh, 904 
P.2d 688, 699 (Utah App. 1995) (an appellate court will "assume 
the regularity of the proceedings below when appellant fails to 
provide an adequate record on appeal") (citation omitted), cert, 
denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996); accord State v. Wulffenstein, 
657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982) (an appellant has "the duty and 
13 
responsibility of supporting [his] allegation by an adequate 
record" and, absent such record, his "assignment of error stands 
as a unilateral allegation which the review court has no power to 
determine"). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
second degree felony conviction for theft from a person. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this Q_ day of December, 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
C .^W^C_ 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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1 bit more further. He said that person was between 
2 five foot, nine and five foot, ten with long blonde 
3 hair. He said he lived in the Magna or West Valley 
4 Area. He indicated that he - the person does 
5 crystal methamphetamine. I pressed him on that He 
6 said that he had actually seen him around it, saw him 
7 do it but it has been within the last two years. He 
8 hasn't seen him recently. But he knows friends of 
9 his who knows Mr. Irvin much better than Mr. Meek 
10 knows him. Additionally, he indicates that one of 
11 his friends is owed money for Mr. Irvin for drugs. 
12 And at this time we would be asking the 
13 Court to continue this. Although we have rested, 
14 this is new information that may be important to the 
15 case; the reason being is Mr. Irvin indicated that he 
16 doesn't use drugs in his testimony. He also 
17 indicated that — there was a statement at the 
18 preliminary hearing where he - his usual practice is 
19 not to buy drugs from strangers, which if we were to 
20 find the person who he owes money to for drugs and he 
21 actually went to school together and were friends 
22 together, that would impeach that statement that -
23 he didn't say that he meant that for face value, that 
24 he meant it sarcastically. And we'd be asking the 
25 Court to give us some time to investigate this 
Page 2 
1 PROCEEDINGS 
2 THE COURT: Miss Clark, you wanted the 
3 convenience of the record? 
4 MS. CLARK: Thank you, Your Honor. This 
5 morning at approximately 10:301 received a note from 
6 Mr. Ellis indicating that a person by the name of 
7 Brian Meek, who is an inmate at the jail - he was 
8 housed in l-B-3 at the time this information was 
9 brought up and now is in Section 7-B - is — was 
10 arrested for no insurance, no registration and no 
11 seat belt He overheard some other people in the 
12 jail speaking about the victim in this case, or the 
13 alleged victim in this case, Joshua Irvin. Mr. Meeks 
14 spoke up and said he knew Mr. Irvin and that he had 
15 seen him in the past being around crystal 
16 methamphetamine and also using crystal 
17 methamphetamine. 
18 I received that information, I notified 
19 the Court, the Court instructed that I go speak to 
20 Mr. Meek. I took my investigator, Patty - 1 forgot 
21 - Rodman is her last name, and we both went and 
22 spoke with Mr. Meek. He indicated to me that he went 
23 to a school with someone by the name of Joshua Irvin 
24 at Cyprus High School. He described the person as 
25 being tall. I asked him to describe that a little 
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better. And, you know, with this just short notice, 
we haven't done anything, but I did speak to this 
Mr. Meek. 
THE COURT: Mr. Freestone? 
MR. FREESTONE: I don't have anything to 
add, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: The request for continuance 
is denied. 
(End supplemental.) 
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